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I
n contrast to their divergent opinions on many
public-policy issues, most economists strongly
support free trade policies. Nonetheless, there
is substantial public opposition for such policies—
from the right as well as the left ends of the political
spectrum. Because public opinion affects policy
decisions, understanding why this gap exists is a
first step in devising strategies to increase public
support for free trade.1 In light of arguments and
evidence indicating that free trade yields substan-
tial benefits, attempts to influence public opinion
seem warranted. 
In the next section I report survey information
highlighting the gap between the views of econ-
omists and the general public on free trade policies.
The primary focus of this paper is on the “whys”
of this gap in the United States. After examining
why most economists support free trade policies, I
explore why free trade is controversial. To ensure
that this discussion about controversial issues is of
a reasonable length, I focus on trade arguments
involving either labor or environmental issues. Next,
I examine suggestions for increasing the support
for free trade. A summary of key points completes
the paper.
DIFFERING VIEWS ON FREE TRADE
POLICIES
Surveys have consistently shown strong support
among economists for free trade policies. In a 1990
survey of economists employed in the United States,
Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan (1992) reported that
more than 90 percent agreed generally with the
proposition that tariffs and import quotas usually
reduce general economic welfare.2 This consensus
mirrored the results of a similar survey in 1976.3
Obviously, the 1990 results are now more than a
decade old, but no compelling reason exists to expect
that a similar survey today would yield substantially
different results. In fact, Mayda and Rodrik (2001,
p. 1) recently stated: “The consensus among main-
stream economists on the desirability of free trade
remains almost universal.”4
On the other hand, the general public is not as
strongly in favor of reducing trade barriers as econ-
omists. Based on answers to a question in a survey
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, it is
clear that the general public in the United States has
major reservations about free trade.5 In response
to a question in 1998 pointing out that the elimina-
tion of tariffs and other import restrictions would
lead to lower prices but that certain jobs in import-
competitive industries would likely be eliminated,
only 32 percent of the general public were in favor
of eliminating tariffs in this case. Meanwhile, 49
percent were more sympathetic to the argument
that tariffs are necessary to protect jobs.6
Survey results presented in Scheve and Slaughter
(2001a) suggest that Americans recognize both the
benefits and costs of international trade. Large
majorities of Americans think that freer trade gener-
ates benefits in terms of lower prices, increased
product variety, and more innovation. On the other
hand, a majority of Americans think that trade
results in fewer jobs and lower wages for some
segments of the labor force. Relative to economists,
however, survey respondents tend to emphasize the
costs rather than the benefits. For example, the 1999
Program on International Policy Attitudes survey
asked whether free trade was a good idea because
it could lead to lower prices and faster growth or a
bad idea because it could lead to lower wages and
lost jobs (University of Maryland, 2000). Survey
respondents were nearly evenly divided, with 51
1 See Blendon et al. (1997) for references showing that public opinion
influences policy decisions.
2 A sample of 1,350 economists employed in the United States was used.
Each recipient was asked to indicate general agreement, agreement
with provisos, or general disagreement with 40 propositions. The
number of respondents was 464, a response rate of 34.4 percent. 
3 See Kearl et al. (1979) for details of this earlier survey. 
4 See Krugman (1997) for a similar opinion.
5 See Rielly (1999).
6 The remaining 19 percent either did not have an opinion or refused
to answer.
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percent saying free trade was a good idea and 44
percent saying it was a bad idea. Five percent did
not know or refused to answer.
WHY ECONOMISTS SUPPORT FREE
TRADE POLICIES
Underlying the consensus among economists
on the desirability of free trade is the judgment that
nations are better off with free trade than with poli-
cies restricting trade.7 Trade can affect a nation’s
income and its economic well-being through
numerous channels. For example, the reduction
of trade barriers allows for gains stemming from
(i) specialization and exchange according to com-
parative advantage, (ii) increasing returns to scale
from larger markets, (iii) the exchange of ideas
through communication and travel, and (iv) the
spread of technology by means of investment and
exposure to new goods. Numerous models have
been developed that show how a nation benefits
from free trade. Rather than discuss numerous
models, I examine the key ideas that economists
stress when discussing the gains from trade. I com-
plete this section by discussing some studies that
measure the gains/losses that are likely to accom-
pany specific trade policies.
The Gains from Trade: A Historical
View8
The most famous demonstration of the gains
from trade appeared in 1817 in David Ricardo’s
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. In his
example, England and Portugal produce the same
two goods, wine and cloth, and the only production
costs are labor costs. The amount of labor (e.g.,
worker-days) required in each country to produce




Because both goods are more costly to produce
in England than in Portugal, England is absolutely
less productive in producing both goods than its
prospective trading partner. Portugal has an absolute
advantage in both wine and cloth. Intuitively, one
might be inclined to conclude that absolute advan-
tage eliminates the possibility of mutual  gains from
trade. Thus, a high productivity (i.e., high income)
country could not engage in mutually beneficial
trade with a low productivity (i.e., low income) coun-
try. Productivity is crucial in determining wages. In
view of absolute advantage, workers in the country
with higher productivity will receive higher wages.
However, absolute advantage is irrelevant in whether
trade can benefit both countries.
What is crucial is that the ratio of the produc-
tion costs for the two goods is different in the two
countries. In England, a bottle of wine will exchange
for 3/7 of a bolt of cloth because the labor content
of the wine is 3/7 of that of cloth. In Portugal, a
bottle of wine will exchange for 1/5 of a bolt of
cloth. Thus, wine is relatively cheaper in Portugal
than in England and, conversely, cloth is relatively
cheaper in England than in Portugal. Economists
say that Portugal has a comparative advantage in
wine production and England has a comparative
advantage in cloth production.
The different relative prices provide the basis for
both countries to gain from international trade. The
gains arise from both exchange and specialization.
The gains from exchange can be shown in the
following manner. If a Portuguese wine producer
sells five bottles of wine at home, he receives one
bolt of cloth. If he trades in England, he receives
more than two bolts of cloth for five bottles of wine.
Hence, he can gain by exporting his wine to England.
English cloth producers are willing to trade in
Portugal; for every 3/7 of a bolt of cloth they sell
there, they receive just over two bottles of wine,
which is better than the one bottle of wine they
would receive in England. Overall, the English gain
from exporting cloth to (and importing wine from)
Portugal, and the Portuguese gain from exporting
wine to (and importing cloth from) England. Each
country gains by exporting the good in which it
has a comparative advantage and by importing the
good in which it has a comparative disadvantage.
Gains can also arise from specialization. Assume
initially that each country is producing some of both
goods. Suppose that, as a result of trade, 21 units of
labor are shifted from wine to cloth production in
England and that 10 units of labor are shifted from
cloth to wine production in Portugal. This realloca-
tion of labor does not change the total amount of
labor used in the two countries; however, it causes
the production changes listed on the next page:
2 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002
7 Irwin (1996, p. 8) summarizes the history of this consensus as follows:
“The case for free trade has endured, however, because the fundamen-
tal proposition that substantial benefits arise from the free exchange
of goods between countries has not been overshadowed by the limited
scope of various qualifications and exceptions.”
8 The bulk of this section appeared in Coughlin, Chrystal, and Wood




The shift of English labor causes cloth produc-
tion to increase by three bolts and wine production
to decline by seven bottles. Meanwhile, the shift
of Portuguese labor causes cloth production to de-
crease by two bolts and wine production to increase
by ten bottles. Overall, the production of both goods
increases. This increased output of three bottles of
wine and one bolt of cloth allows both countries to
increase their consumption of both goods. Thus,
specialization due to trade based on comparative
advantage provides mutual benefits.
The Gains from Trade: Selected
Developments Since Ricardo
Not surprisingly, trade theory has progressed
since Ricardo. Some of the developments provide
alternative explanations of comparative advantage,
while others use different explanations of trade
flows.
The most well-known alternative explanation
of comparative advantage is the Heckscher-Ohlin
model of international trade. This model is based
on (i) the fact that countries differ from each other
in terms of their productive resources (e.g., labor,
capital, natural resources) and (ii) the fact that goods
are produced using different proportions of those
resources.
To illustrate the theory, assume two countries,
China and Japan; two productive resources, labor
and capital; and two goods, automobiles and cloth-
ing. Assume further that China’s endowment of
labor relative to capital exceeds that of Japan. In
this case China is relatively well endowed with labor.
Conversely, Japan is relatively well endowed with
capital. Thus, one should expect that the price of
labor relative to capital would be lower in China
than in Japan.
Next, assume that in the production of clothing
the use of labor relative to capital is greater than in
the production of automobiles. In this case, clothing
is produced by relatively labor-intensive methods
and, conversely, automobiles are produced by rela-
tively capital-intensive methods.
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory states the follow-
ing: A country will be able to produce a good at a
relatively lower cost if its production requires a
relatively larger proportion of a relatively abundant
resource in that country. (That is, a relatively abun-
dant resource would be a relatively less expensive
factor of production.) In the present example, this
implies that China should have a comparative
advantage in clothing and Japan should have a
comparative advantage in automobiles. As in the
Ricardian case, the different relative prices provide
the basis for both countries to gain from interna-
tional trade by means of exchange (i.e., Japan will
export automobiles and import clothing and China
will export clothing and import automobiles) and
specialization (i.e., Japan will increase its production
of automobiles and China will increase its produc-
tion of clothing).9
An appealing feature of the Heckscher-Ohlin
model is that it can generate insights into the politi-
cal economy of trade policy. The preceding discus-
sion suggests that allowing for free trade sets in
motion a number of price changes. Specifically,
the relative prices of goods in the two countries
should tend to equalize, as well as the prices of the
productive resources. In the two-country, two-good,
two-resource world discussed above, the payments
to one factor in a specific country will rise and the
payments to the other factor will fall.
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that free
international trade benefits a country’s abundant
resource and harms that country’s scarce resource.
In the preceding example, this means that capital
will benefit and labor will be harmed in Japan.
Meanwhile, labor will benefit and capital will be
harmed in China.10 As a result, it is easy to see why
labor in Japan would be opposed to the reduction
of trade barriers with China and that capital would
support such a change. Later in the paper I use the
Stolper-Samuelson theorem in the context of U.S.
trade policy.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model focuses on inter-
industry trade. This trade exists when a country
exports goods produced by one industry in exchange
for goods produced by another industry in a second
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9 In contrast to the Ricardian assumption of constant opportunity costs,
the Heckscher-Ohlin model allows for increasing opportunity costs.
In many cases, increasing opportunity costs, which imply that costs
per unit increase as more of a good is produced, are more realistic
than constant opportunity costs.
10 The intuition is straightforward. Prior to free trade, labor in Japan is
relatively scarce and, thus, wages tend to be high. With free trade, the
relative scarcity of labor is reduced by the fact that Japanese consumers
can buy the labor-intensive good at a lower price from China. Thus,
there is downward pressure on the price of labor in Japan. Similar
reasoning can be applied to explain why capital in Japan benefits
from free trade. 
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machinery to China in exchange for clothing. A
common feature of the trade between industrialized
countries is that they export and import similar
types of products, which is known as intra-industry
trade. For example, industrialized countries export
and import different models of automobiles. Such
trade likely requires explanations other than those
based on comparative advantage. One explanation
revolves around increasing returns to scale, which
are said to exist when an identical percentage
increase in the use of each productive input causes
an even larger percentage increase in output. For
example, if the use of each input were increased by
10 percent, output would increase by more than 10
percent. If increasing returns exist, then the cost per
unit for the firm (industry) declines as its output
increases.
In a world with increasing returns to scale, bene-
fits from free trade arise because removing trade
barriers allows a country to specialize in industries
where average costs decline as output expands.
Another view of this phenomenon is that productiv-
ity in the industry increases as more resources are
utilized. These productivity increases are an impor-
tant source of the gains from trade.
The existence of increasing returns to scale
complicates the analysis of international trade by
forcing the consideration of market structures other
than perfect competition and raises the possibility
that both countries do not gain from trade.11 Overall,
however, recent theoretical developments have
likely strengthened the case for an open trading
system by highlighting three sources of gains from
trade. First, as highlighted in the preceding para-
graph, as the market potentially served by firms
expands, there are gains associated with declining
per-unit production costs. A second source of gains
results from the reduction in the monopoly power of
domestic firms, who face increased pressures from
foreign competitors to produce output demanded
by consumers at the lowest possible cost. The third
gain is that consumers enjoy increased product
variety and lower prices.
The Gains from Trade: A Graphical View
Many of the key ideas discussed previously can
be illustrated graphically. For space reasons I limit
my focus to the static gains from trade by using a
partial equilibrium approach.12 Static gains refer to
one-time benefits of reducing trade barriers that
arise as national (domestic) prices move closer to
global (world) prices. The price changes stemming
from the liberalization of trade cause productive
resources to be reallocated and consumption pat-
terns to change, which result in the gains from
specialization and exchange identified by Ricardo.
The illustration of the static gains from free
trade using partial equilibrium analysis assuming
perfectly competitive markets is straightforward.13
As discussed previously, different relative prices for
the same good in two countries provide a funda-
mental reason for international trade. If the price
in the United States is higher than the price abroad
when no trade is allowed, then the good will be
imported into the United States when free trade is
allowed.14 On the other hand, if the price in the
United States is lower than the price abroad when
no trade is allowed, then the good will be exported
from the United States when free trade is allowed.
Consequently, two cases—one in which the good is
imported into the United States and the other in
which the good is exported from the United States—
are examined.
In the first case, the price of a hypothetical good
abroad is assumed to be lower than that in the United
States. In Figure 1 the lines SUS and DUS are the U.S.
supply and demand curves for the hypothetical
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11 A closely related issue that requires the consideration of imperfectly
competitive market structures is strategic trade policy. When a small
number of firms from different countries compete internationally
(e.g., the aircraft industry), the theoretical case for free trade becomes
somewhat murky. Government subsidies to a domestic firm can affect
the behavior of foreign firms so as to benefit the subsidizing country.
However, the theory of strategic trade policy, because many of its policy
implications hinge on key assumptions, does not provide a strong
enough case to alter substantially economists’ opinions about free
trade. See Chapter 14 in Irwin (1996) for a summary of this issue.
12 The static gains from trade are the increases in economic well-being,
with fixed levels of productive resources and technology, accruing to
a nation as it changes from a policy of allowing no international trade
to a policy of free trade. A partial equilibrium approach focuses on how
price adjusts to equate quantity supplied with quantity demanded
in a single market. The prices of all other goods and resources are
assumed to remain unchanged. Alternatively, a general equilibrium
approach examines the simultaneous determination of prices and
quantities in all markets in an economy. 
13 A market is perfectly competitive if (i) there are many firms producing
the good, each with a small market share; (ii) all firms produce a
homogeneous product using identical production processes; (iii) all
buyers and sellers possess perfect information; and (iv) firms can
enter and exit the industry costlessly. 
14 Zero transportation costs are assumed to simplify the analysis. In
addition, the foreign good is assumed to be a perfect substitute for
the domestically produced good. Such an assumption is unlikely to
apply to most traded goods, especially manufactured goods. Assuming
foreign and domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes
complicates the analysis but does not alter the basic welfare effects.
See Husted and Melvin (2001, pp. 180-82).
Coughlin REVIEWgood. Their intersection at B results in the equilib-
rium values for price, PUS, and quantity, QUS, of the
good. Meanwhile, SW is the supply curve abroad.
This curve, represented by a horizontal line, is based
on an assumption that U.S. purchases will not affect
the price abroad, which in this case is PW. If one
allows for free trade, this lower price abroad has two
effects in the United States. First, U.S. consumers will
increase their purchases of this good from QUS to
the free trade level of QDFT. Second, U.S. producers
will decrease their production of this good from QUS
to the free-trade level of QSFT. U.S. purchases in
excess of U.S. production (i.e., QDFT less QSFT) reflect
the quantity of imports.
The lower price simultaneously benefits the
U.S. consumers of this product and harms the U.S.
producers of this product, a fact that can be used to
explain why a free-trade policy is controversial. The
magnitude of these gains and losses can be seen in
Figure 1 using the concepts of consumer and pro-
ducer surplus.15
First, we look at consumers, who gain in two
ways. Prior to free trade, consumers purchased QUS
at a price per unit of PUS. With free trade, they pay
the lower price per unit of PW for QUS. This gain in
consumer surplus is represented by the rectangle
PUSBEPW. In addition, consumers gain because the
lower price induces consumers to increase their
purchases from QUS to QDFT. This additional increase
in consumer surplus is represented by the triangle
BCE. Thus, the total gain for consumers is the area
PUSBCPW or, using lower case letters to represent
specific areas, a+b+c. 
Analogously, producers lose because of the
lower price per unit they receive for their output,
QSFT, and the contraction of production from QUS
to QSFT. Thus, the total loss incurred by producers
is the area PUSBFPW or a. Overall, the United States
gains because the consumer gains exceed the pro-
ducer losses by b+c.
The preceding analysis can also be used for the
case when the good is exported from the United
States under free trade. The key modification of
Figure 1 to create Figure 2 is that the price of the
good prior to free trade is higher abroad than in the
United States. The horizontal supply curve abroad,
SW, is based on the assumption that U.S. production
will not affect the world price. Consequently, if one
allows for free trade, the higher price abroad has
two effects in the United States. First, U.S. consumers
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15 Consumer surplus is the difference between the amount consumers
are willing to pay to purchase a given quantity of goods and the amount
they have to pay to purchase those goods. Producer surplus is the
difference between the price paid in the market for a good and the
minimum price required by an industry to supply the good.























The Gains from Trade: 


























The Gains from Trade:
The United States as an Exporter
Figure 2will decrease their purchases of this good from QUS
to the free-trade level of QDFT. Second, U.S. producers
will increase their production of this good from QUS
to the free-trade level of QSFT. U.S. production in
excess of U.S. purchases (i.e., QSFT less QDFT) reflects
the quantity of exports.
The higher price simultaneously harms the
U.S. consumers of this product and benefits the
U.S. producers of this product. U.S. consumers lose
because with free trade they are paying a higher
price per unit, PW versus PUS, for a smaller quantity
of the export good, QDFT versus QUS. The reduction
in consumer surplus is represented by the area
PUSBHPW or e+f. Meanwhile, U.S. producers benefit
from the higher price they receive for their prior
output. In addition, they receive increased producer
surplus as they expand production from QUS to QSFT.
The total gain for producers is the area PUSBGPW or
e+f+g. Overall, the U.S. benefits because the pro-
ducer gains exceed the consumer losses by g.
The preceding partial equilibrium analysis is
suggestive of the gains that the United States would
generate as it moved from self-sufficiency to free
trade. Obviously, the transition from self-sufficiency
to free trade would set in motion numerous price
changes. A general equilibrium approach allows
for the simultaneous determination of prices and
quantities in numerous markets. However, this theo-
retical advantage comes at the cost of increasing
complexity in illustrating the gains from free trade;
such an approach is not essential in this paper.16
The Dynamic Gains from Free Trade
Free trade can also contribute to economic
growth, which is another source of gains. Such
dynamic gains are potentially more important than
the static gains. Most economic models suggest that
trade liberalization will have a positive effect on
economic growth.17 An economy grows over time
as a result of increases in its productive resources
or technological innovation; both developments
increase the capacity of an economy to produce
goods and services. In addition, reducing trade
barriers might increase competitive pressures that
would force the efficient use of a nation’s resources.
Economic theory suggests a number of routes by
which freer trade can stimulate growth.
One route is through increased savings that
ultimately fund investment spending. Such spending
increases the amount of capital. As argued previously,
trade raises the level of real income, some of which
can be saved. This higher level of savings translates
into a greater availability of funds for investment
spending. Free trade also allows the possibility for
a country to borrow the savings of other countries.
When a country imports more than it exports, a
country is effectively borrowing funds from the rest
of the world. If these funds are being used to finance
the imports of capital goods, then a country’s capital
is increased.
A country, however, need not run trade deficits
to import capital goods. When a country imports
capital goods in exchange for consumer goods, then
its productive capacity increases. This productive
capacity allows for subsequent increases in output.
A related idea, stressed by Richardson (2001), is
that free trade increases the possibility that a firm
importing a capital good will be able to locate a
supplier who will provide a good that more nearly
meets its specifications. The better the match, the
larger is the resulting increase in productivity, which
ultimately translates into higher incomes.18
International trade may also spur the diffusion
of technology by increasing the commercial contacts
between employees in firms from different coun-
tries.19 Such interactions serve to transfer informa-
tion about new products and production processes.
Of course, formal transactions may also facilitate
the transfer of technology. Licensing is a common
practice that allows the international transfer of
technology. In addition, technology is embodied in
new capital equipment. Thus, freer international
trade facilitates the transfer of technology interna-
tionally and spurs economic growth.
Another potential route for economic growth
results from the competitive pressures associated
with international trade. Opening a country’s markets
to foreign firms tends to reduce the market power of
domestic firms. For example, domestic monopolists
are subjected to competitive pressures. As a result,
the domestic firms are forced to become more effi-
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16 See Husted and Melvin (2001, Chap. 4).
17 Whether the growth effect is temporary or permanent is closely
related to whether an endogenous growth model or a neoclassical
growth model is more nearly “true.” In both types of models, a trade
policy change can affect growth by altering either the accumulation
of productive resources or technological progress.
18 The same reasoning pertains to the gain for a consumer in finding a
good that more nearly matches his/her preferences.
19 Richardson (2001) notes that increased trade generates externalities
by producing information about foreign markets and customers that
spreads from those involved in international trade to those who are
not. Such information can lower the cost of international trade and
induce new firms to become involved.
Coughlin REVIEWcient or else they perish. Either way, a nation’s pro-
ductive resources will be used more efficiently in
producing the goods that consumers desire.
A final route is related to the prior discussion
suggesting that, as international trade expands the
size of a market that firms face, firms might be able
to exploit economies of scale. Recall that increased
output at lower per unit cost is a clear-cut gain.
Moreover, the larger market size might also spur
research and development spending because the
spending can be spread over larger levels of output.
If successful, the spending would increase the pro-
ductive capacity of the country.20
Empirical Studies of the Gains from
Trade and the Losses from Protectionist
Policies
The preceding discussion of international trade
theory provides many reasons why economists
support free trade policies. Empirical studies provide
additional reasons. As discussed previously, a funda-
mental proposition is that international trade allows
a country to achieve a higher real income than would
otherwise be attained. Empirical evidence tends to
confirm this proposition. For example, Frankel and
Romer (1999) find that the impact of trade on in-
come in 1985 is positive; however, in their study the
precise impact is uncertain. Increasing the ratio of
trade to gross domestic product by 1 percentage
point raises per capita income by between 0.5 and
2 percent. Irwin and Terviö (2000), in an extension
of Frankel and Romer, find that the impact of trade
on income is positive for various periods in the
twentieth century. These results suggest, at a mini-
mum, that policies restricting international trade
can result in substantial costs in terms of actual per
capita income falling short of potential per capita
income.
Additional empirical evidence focused directly
on the issue of free trade has also been generated.
Numerous estimates of the static and dynamic costs/
benefits using partial as well as general equilibrium
approaches have been produced assessing the con-
sequences of trade policy changes. Using a partial
equilibrium approach, it is easy to illustrate the
effects of a trade policy change via supply and
demand curves. Figure 3 shows the supply and
demand curves for a hypothetical good imported
into the United States that is subject to a tariff. Iden-
tical to Figure 1 the free trade results reveal, given
the free trade price of PW, U.S. consumption of
QDFT, production of QSFT, and imports equal to the
difference between QDFT and QSFT. Assume a tariff
is imposed, causing the price in the United States to
increase to PT. The price in the United States now
exceeds the price in the world by the amount of the
tariff, PWPT.
The higher U.S. price causes consumer pur-
chases to decrease from QDFT to QDT, production to
increase from QSFT to QST, and imports to decrease
from QSFTQDFT to QSTQDT. The imposition of the
tariff causes consumers to lose d+e+f+g, while
producers gain d. Thus, domestic producers are
protected from foreign competition at the expense
of domestic consumers. One complication is that
the government collects tariff revenue. This revenue,
which can be viewed as a gain for the government,
equals the tariff, PWPT, times the quantity of imports,
QSTQDT. This revenue is represented by area f.
Overall, the United States loses because the
losses of consumers, d+e+f+g, exceed the gains
of producers, d, and of government, f. The net
national loss is e+g. Area e is called a “deadweight
production loss” and reflects the loss from ineffi-
cient (excessive) production, while area g is called
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20 The automobile industry illustrates many of the routes producing
dynamic gains from trade, especially those stemming from the diffusion
of technology, competitive pressures, and economies of scale. See
Fuss and Waverman (1992). 

























The Effects of a U.S. Tariff
Figure 3Coughlin REVIEW
a “deadweight consumption loss” and reflects the
loss from inefficient (too little) consumption.
Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) have generated esti-
mates of the potential net national gains by industry,
as well as the consumer gains and producer losses,
if the United States were to liberalize trade in 21
industries. Table 1 reveals that the gains for con-
sumers in the apparel industry would exceed $21
billion if protection were removed. Not surprisingly,
a substantial portion of this gain would come at the
expense of producers whose losses would by nearly
$10 billion. The net national gain from liberalizing
trade in the apparel industry would be $7.7 billion.
Additional perspective is provided by expressing
the consumer and national gains relative to the job
losses in the apparel industry resulting from the
liberalization. The consumer gain per job lost is
$139,000, and the net national gain per job lost is
$51,000. What this means is that consumers were
effectively paying an average of $139,000 for each
job protected in 1990 in the apparel industry, an
industry in which the average pay of a production
worker was less than $15,000.
Clearly, the net national gains from liberalizing
trade in the apparel industry exceed by a large
amount the potential gains from liberalizing other
8 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2002
Welfare Effects of Liberalizing Trade in Certain U.S. Industries, 1990 (millions of dollars)
Net 
Net  Consumer gain  national gain 
Tariff or  Consumer  Producer  national  per job lost  per job lost 
Industry equivalent gain loss gain (dollars) (dollars)
Ball bearings 11.0% 64 13 1 438,356 6,849
Benzenoid chemicals 9.0 309 127 10 >1,000,000 46,296
Canned tuna 12.5 73 31 10 187,179 25,641
Ceramic articles 11.0 102 18 2 244,019 4,785
Ceramic tiles 19.0 139 45 2 400,576 5,764
Costume jewelry 9.0 103 46 5 96,532 4,686
Frozen orange juice  30.0 281 101 35 461,412 57,471
concentrate
Glassware 11.0 266 162 9 180,095 6,093
Luggage 16.5 211 16 26 933,628 115,044
Polyethylene resins 12.0 176 95 20 590,604 67,114
Rubber footwear 20.0 208 55 12 122,281 7,055
Softwood lumber 6.5 459 264 12 758,678 19,835
Women’s footwear,  10.0 376 70 11 101,567 2,971
except athletic
Women’s handbags 13.5 148 16 13 191,462 16,818
Dairy products 50.0 1,184 835 104 497,897 43,734
Peanuts 50.0 54 32 22 136,020 55,416
Sugar 66.0 1,357 776 581 600,177 256,966
Maritime transport 85.0 1,832 1,275 556 415,325 126,049
Apparel 48.0 21,158 9,901 7,712 138,666 50,543
Textiles 23.4 3,274 1,749 894 202,061 55,175
Machine tools 46.6 542 157 385 348,329 247,429
NOTE: Tariffs are the primary protective device for the first 14 industries in the Table. Import quotas are used for dairy products,
peanuts, sugar, and maritime transport. Voluntary export restraints are used for apparel, textiles, and machine tools.
SOURCE: Derived from Tables 1.2 and 1.3 in Hufbauer and Elliott (1994).
Table 1industries. However, there are large gains that could
be realized by liberalizing trade in a number of other
industries. Net national gains exceed $500 million
dollars in the textiles, sugar, and maritime transport
industries. Moreover, the consumer gain per job lost
in the sugar industry is $600,000 and the net national
gain per job lost is $257,000. It is also noteworthy
how much consumers can gain per job lost in other
industries. In the benzenoid chemicals industry the
consumer gain per job lost exceeds $1 million; in
the luggage industry the consumer gain per job lost
exceeds $900,000. In the latter case, the net national
gain per job lost is $115,000.
A recent study by the U.S. International Trade
Commission (1999) uses a general equilibrium
approach to explore the consequences of liberaliz-
ing trade in industries subject to significant trade
restrictions. Based on 1996 data, the simultaneous
liberalization of all significant restraints causes a net
national gain of $12.4 billion, as shown in Table 2.
Given the results in Hufbauer and Elliott (1994), it is
not surprising that the elimination of trade barriers
in the textiles and apparel sector yields the majority
of the gains. Nor is it surprising that the maritime
transport, sugar, footwear, and dairy industries are
the sources for the majority of the rest of the gains. 
The preceding examples reveal the possibility
of substantial gains by liberalizing trade in selected
industries. Overall, however, U.S. trade policy can
be characterized as “open” relative to the policies
of other countries. Consequently, estimates of the
gains from trade do not reflect a change from the
prohibition of trade to free trade, but rather a change
from some level of trade restriction to free trade.
From this perspective it should not be surprising
that, relative to total U.S. economic activity, the static
gains from eliminating trade barriers (or the costs
stemming from the existing trade barriers) are rela-
tively small.21 Of course, one might argue that gains
exceeding $12 billion are still substantial.
The preceding discussion has been focused on
unilateral reductions of U.S. trade barriers.22 Hertel
(2000) provides a quantitative assessment of the
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21 See Zarazaga (1999) for a survey of static models of unilateral trade
liberalization. He concludes that the gains range from negligible to
moderate.
22 Unilateral trade liberalization is an alternative to negotiated reductions,
which become very complex as the number of goods and services
being discussed increases and as the number of countries involved
increases. Jackson (1997) noted that 26,000 pages were used to list the
results of the Uruguay Round, the most recent multilateral round that
lasted more than eight years and involved more than 120 countries.
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Welfare Estimates of Liberalizing Trade in Highly-Protected Sectors, 1996 (millions of dollars)
Sector Welfare increase
Simultaneous sector liberalization of all significant restraints 12,402
Individual liberalization:
Textiles and apparel 10,376




Ball and roller bearings, and parts 49
Frozen fruit, fruit juices, and vegetables 28
Costume jewelry and costume novelties 19
Leather gloves and mittens 16




SOURCE: U.S. International Trade Commission (1999, Table ES-1).
Table 2potential gains from trade liberalization under a
new round of multilateral negotiations. Specifically,
Hertel analyzed a worldwide, across-the-board
elimination of protection in agriculture and in a
subset of services—business and financial services
and construction services—as well as the elimina-
tion of tariffs in manufacturing. He estimated that
the gains in real income for Canada, Mexico, and the
United States as a whole were 0.37 percent of their
income. Because the size of the U.S. economy is
substantially larger than either Canada’s or Mexico’s,
it is reasonable to infer that the specific gains as a
share of income for the United States are roughly
0.37 percent as well. Such a percentage is consistent
with most estimates of the static gains for the United
States.
In contrast to the findings concerning the static
gains, one finds that the empirical literature assess-
ing the relationship between trade policy and
economic growth is far from definitive. Numerous
problems with this empirical analysis preclude an
unqualified conclusion.23 Many studies, using differ-
ent data sets, countries, and methodologies, have
found that countries with more-open trade policies
(i.e., those closer to free trade) tend to grow faster
than countries with less-open trade policies.24 For
example, Sachs and Warner (1995, pp. 35-36) find
a strong association between openness and
growth, both within the group of developing
and the group of developed countries. With-
in the group of developing countries, the
open economies grew at 4.49 percent per
year, and the closed economies grew at
0.69 percent per year. Within the group of
developed economies, the open economies
grew at 2.29 percent, and the closed econ-
omies grew at 0.74 percent per year.
However, Harrison and Hanson (1999) argue
that the openness index used by Sachs and Warner
does not measure trade policy only. Harrison and
Hanson go on to show that the components most
closely linked to trade policy in Sachs and Warner’s
index are not related to growth.25 Thus, the results
are sensitive to the measurement of trade policy.
To illustrate further this sensitivity in the mea-
surement of trade policy, Harrison and Hanson
replace Sachs and Warner’s measures of tariffs and
quotas with an alternative tariff measure. In this
case, openness to trade has a significant impact on
growth. A decrease in the tariff rate of 10 percentage
points causes an increase in average growth in real
per capita gross domestic product of 0.5 to 0.6
percent.
The question of the robustness of the relation-
ship between openness and productivity growth is
explored in detail in Edwards (1998). Using data for
93 countries, he found that the more open countries
experienced faster productivity growth. This basic
finding held up despite the use of different openness
indicators, estimation techniques, time periods, and
functional forms.26
In summary, the empirical literature clearly
indicates that liberalizing trade in highly protected
industries is likely to yield gains. Whether those
gains are large is in the eye of the beholder. The
evidence concerning the dynamic gains from trade
reveals that economies that are more open are likely
to grow faster. If the faster growth is long-lived, sub-
stantial increases in well-being can be generated.
WHY FREE TRADE IS CONTROVERSIAL
What Does Research Based on Self-
Interested Behavior Reveal?
To understand the opposition to free trade, one
must understand the preferences of individuals as
they relate to the policy choices available to policy-
makers. Unfortunately, most economic research
does not provide direct evidence on the prefer-
ences of individuals. Generally speaking, empirical
research on the political economy of trade policy
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23 One problem is difficulty of measuring trade policy. The choice of
indicators for “openness” is somewhat arbitrary. A second problem
arises because free trade countries may also adopt simultaneously
other policies that affect income and growth. Thus, a researcher can-
not be certain that the estimated impact of the trade policy measure
is capturing solely the impact of trade policy. A third problem is that
growth may affect openness just as openness may affect growth.
Estimating a single equation in which growth is affected by openness
may yield a biased estimate. 
24 For a more thorough discussion of the empirical evidence on the
relationship between trade policy and growth—including an extensive
bibliography of relevant studies—see a 1997 report by the United
States International Trade Commission.
25 A frequently cited study showing no strong relationship between
liberalizing trade and long-run growth is by Levine and Renelt (1992);
however, they found a robust, positive relationship between investment
and trade share that led them to conclude that trade reform may gener-
ate growth through increased capital accumulation.
26 Empirical evidence on trade policy and growth consists primarily of
cross-country analyses. Ideally, one would like to use a dynamic,
general equilibrium model for a specific country. Zarazaga (2000)
concludes that minimal progress has occurred in constructing and
estimating such a model. 
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sentatives do respond to the economic interests of
their constituents, these outcomes certainly depend
on the preferences of individuals. However, there
are a number of other factors that come into play,
such as the influence of interest groups, the prefer-
ences of policymakers, and the institutional struc-
ture of government. These other factors preclude
the researcher from making definitive statements
about individual preferences.27
Nonetheless, the voluminous literature on the
determinants of protection does provide some results
suggestive of individual preferences. For example,
protection received by an industry is higher when
it is a labor-intensive, low-skill, low-wage industry.
This suggests that individuals are willing to support
trade restrictions to improve the job and income
prospects of low-income workers.
A recent study by Scheve and Slaughter (2001b)
focuses specifically on individual preferences. They
find that the lower the skill level of a worker, mea-
sured by education or average occupational earnings,
the stronger is the worker’s support for new trade
barriers.28 This result is consistent with a Heckscher-
Ohlin trade model in which the United States is well
endowed with skilled labor. Recalling the prior dis-
cussion of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the
movement to free trade would tend to increase the
incomes of skilled labor. Meanwhile, the incomes of
unskilled labor would fall further behind. Because
less-skilled workers have experienced sharp declines
in their wages relative to more-skilled workers,
Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) argue that the differ-
ences in their attitudes toward free trade may reflect
the different wage-growth experiences of these
groups since the early 1970s.29 Arguably, the poor
labor-market results of low-skilled workers, both
absolutely and relative to high-skilled workers,
could be due to other factors such as technological
changes favoring high-skilled workers.30 Scheve
and Slaughter argue that, regardless of the reasons
for their poor labor-market experience, those with
relatively less education and skill expect the labor-
market results stemming from additional interna-
tional trade flows to be harmful.
More generally, the public fails to see any broad-
based gains from trade. For example, the University
of Maryland (2000) survey of public opinion found
that Americans viewed the benefits of trade as
flowing to business rather than to themselves or to
American workers in general. The difficulty of envi-
sioning broad-based gains might simply reflect the
difficulty of envisioning any gains. As discussed
previously, the static gains for an average individual
of implementing free trade for the United States
are small. Moreover, it is likely difficult for non-
economists to envision how free trade will spur
economic growth that will improve their economic
well-being. Thus, because they do not see personal
benefits, it is easy to see why individuals lack enthusi-
asm about trade negotiations.
Other Perspectives: The Social
Dimensions of Trade
A foundation of economic analysis is self-inter-
ested behavior. In the present context, this implies
that individuals evaluate trade policy based on how
their current well-being is affected without regard
for national well-being. However, people act for
various reasons, some of which are materialistic and
some of which are humanitarian. The allowance
for self-interested behavior beyond those satisfying
material demands complicates economic analysis.
Nonetheless, such motives might well be important
in understanding the opposition to free trade policies.
Employment/Income Concerns. The survey
information cited previously indicates one of the
reasons that the general public remains reluctant
to support the free trade policies espoused by most
economists: concern about jobs, but not necessarily
their own. One might view this reason as reflecting
humanitarian motives. Kinder and Kiewert (1979)
argue that voters are motivated by collective well-
being as well as their own individual well-being.
One manifestation of such preferences is reflected
in an observation by Krueger (1990). She argued
that U.S. residents who stand to gain from trade
liberalization may oppose it, nonetheless, when
there are identifiable losers.
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27 See Rodrik (1995) for further discussion of this and many other issues
related to trade policy.
28 Because economists, on average, are more highly educated than the
general public, this finding produces another reason why the free
trade views of economists differ from those of the general public.
29 Actually, the focus of Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) is on globalization,
which includes immigration and foreign direct investment as well as
international trade. Those with relatively less education and skill
expect the labor market results stemming from further globalization
to harm their well-being. This interpretation based on economic self-
interest is not widely accepted. The standard view is that the opposition
consists of a combination of groups with varied interests, not all of
which can be connected to their economic self-interest.
30 See Richardson (1995) for an analysis of the controversy concerning
trade and income inequality.
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analysis underlying Figure 1. In Figure 1 a given
value of losses suffered by producers were netted,
dollar for dollar, against the larger value of gains
received by consumers. However, it is possible that
it is not that simple. For example, assume a change
in trade policy that would cause a $105 gain for a
high-income individual but a $100 loss for a low-
income individual. Despite a net national gain of $5,
it is possible that a third party might oppose such
a change because the adverse effect for the low-
income individual might be viewed as outweighing
the beneficial effect for the high-income individual.31
In addition, there are short-run adjustment
costs stemming from changes in trade policy that
might generate opposition. Because some industries
will reduce production, some workers will lose their
jobs. Being unemployed, regardless of its length, is
a noteworthy cost that generates opposition to pro-
posed trade-policy changes from both those likely
to be adversely affected and those who sympathize
with them.
The sense of community highlighted by Kinder
and Kiewert (1979) might well extend beyond U.S.
borders. Evidence suggests that U.S. consumers care
about the conditions of the workers in developing
countries.32 Elliott and Freeman (2001) concluded
that the vast majority of people are willing to pay
higher prices for items produced under better work-
ing conditions in developing countries. In addition,
most Americans favor linking labor standards to
trade.33 The 1999 Program on International Policy
Attitudes survey found that 93 percent of respon-
dents felt that as part of international trade agree-
ments countries should be required to maintain
minimum standards for working conditions (Univer-
sity of Maryland, 2000). In this same survey, three-
quarters of the respondents felt morally obligated
to help workers faced with poor working conditions.
Moreover, roughly the same percentage reported a
willingness to pay $5 more for a $20 garment if they
knew it was not made in a sweatshop.34 Overall,
most respondents found the arguments for mini-
mum standards (that harsh conditions are immoral
and that standards eliminate cost advantages due to
exploitation) to be more convincing than the argu-
ments against standards (that the standards might
hinder exports and reduce jobs in developing coun-
tries, as well as impinge on national sovereignty).
Note, however, that self-interest might provide
a reason for some to argue for the linking of labor
standards with international trade. Even when differ-
ing labor standards are appropriate given the specific
situations of individual countries (i.e., the benefits
exceed the costs at the national level), differing labor
standards do provide cost advantages to firms in
countries with relatively low standards. These
advantages cause competitive problems for firms
in countries, such as the United States, with relatively
high standards. Such competitive problems are
especially pronounced for those firms and workers
in labor-intensive industries. Thus, higher standards
would serve the interests of those being harmed by
the imports from low-cost competitors. Not surpris-
ingly, countries with low standards view the pro-
posals to link labor standards with trade measures
as protectionist because such proposals would tend
to eliminate some of the cost advantages possessed
by the firms in these countries.
Environmental Concerns. Similar to linking
labor standards to trade, sentiment exists for link-
ing environmental issues to trade. A fundamental
concern is that free trade will stimulate economic
growth and that this growth will harm the environ-
ment.35 This argument illustrates a basic source for
conflict between free traders and environmentalists.
Proponents of free trade want to remove govern-
mentally imposed trade barriers so that markets can
generate efficient results, while environmentalists
see free trade as generating consequences that
require additional governmental regulations.
The 1999 Program on International Policy
Attitudes survey revealed that 77 percent of respon-
dents felt there should be more international agree-
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31 In theory, the “winner” could compensate the “loser” for his losses
and still be better off; however, this is very difficult to implement in
the real world. Policies that attempt to reduce the costs incurred by
the “losers” are discussed later. 
32 Issues involving child labor have provoked intense controversy. Basu
(1999) noted that in 1995 at least 120 million children between the
ages of 5 and 14 worked full-time. The number working rises to 250
million when part-time workers are included. Not surprisingly, the
incidence of child labor is highest in developing countries and has
been so for several decades.
33 Labor standards are the norms and rules governing working conditions
and industrial relations. Standards addressing the freedom of associa-
tion (i.e., the right of workers to establish and join organizations of
their own choosing), the right to organize and bargain collectively,
and the abolition of forced labor are commonly viewed as core labor
standards.
34 Of course, the behavior suggested by survey responses need not coin-
cide with actual behavior. Elliott and Freeman (2001) discuss evidence
suggesting that people do behave in ways consistent with these survey
results. 
35 As discussed later, economic growth does not necessarily lead to
environmental degradation.
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ments on environmental standards. Underlying
this result is a belief by many that environmental
problems, such as acid rain and greenhouse gases,
are global in nature. Clearly, acid rain and green-
house gases are international issues that require a
solution among governments; however, many econ-
omists would argue that many environmental prob-
lems are domestic issues that require a national
solution. Views of what constitutes a strictly domes-
tic environmental problem and what constitutes an
international one can differ.
Some of the concern about the environment,
however, can be linked to U.S. jobs. For example, 67
percent of respondents felt that the absence of inter-
national environmental standards would threaten
U.S. jobs, as well as the environment, because lower
environmental standards abroad would make the
United States a less competitive location and would
induce U.S. companies to relocate. This view that
diversity in environmental standards would affect
the desirability of maintaining/locating production
in the United States tends to make allies of U.S.
companies, labor unions, and environmentalists.
In terms of trade negotiations, this view requires
that environmental regulations must be harmonized
with, at least, existing U.S. standards prior to allow-
ing for free trade. Many economists, however, would
argue that domestic environmental problems should
be handled nationally and that international differ-
ences in environmental standards are natural.
Generally speaking, the survey respondents did
not support views on environmental issues based
on either national sovereignty or fairness. Only 33
percent supported the view that each country should
decide how to deal with environmental issues. Only
37 percent supported the view that, because the
costs of complying with international environmental
standards would vary across countries, such stan-
dards would be unfair for countries with relatively
high compliance costs. The prevailing views in this
survey likely conflict with views that most econ-
omists hold. For example, most economists would
argue that a national problem requires a national
solution and that the costs as well as the benefits
of any proposed solution be considered.
Clearly, the protection of U.S. jobs underlies
the environmental position of many. Nonetheless,
there is evidence that, when faced with a trade-off
between protecting the environment and increasing
jobs and economic growth, a majority of Americans,
52 percent, chose protecting the environment. Of
the remainder, 37 percent chose jobs and 10 per-
cent viewed the environment and jobs as equally
important.
BRIDGING THE GAP
Three approaches have been suggested to move
public opinion toward supporting free trade. The
first approach is to increase economic education
on free trade. The second approach reduces the
costs borne by those who are harmed by the imple-
mentation of free trade policies. In other words,
those incurring job losses and wage reductions
might be compensated to ameliorate these costs.
As a result, those facing job and wage uncertainty
related to proposed trade agreements, as well as
those concerned about these individuals, might be
more inclined to support trade liberalization. The
third approach attempts to increase support for
free trade by expanding the agenda encompassed
by trade negotiations. By addressing additional
issues, such as those of concern to labor and environ-
mental interests, support for trade liberalization
efforts may be increased.
Education
Because economists find the arguments for free
trade to be convincing, they are inclined to think
that increased economic knowledge would increase
public support for free trade. Some evidence—
admittedly sparse—supports this view. Research
by Saunders (1980) and Gleason and Van Scyoc
(1995) indicates that a college economics course
has a lasting impact on the economic knowledge of
adults. Walstad (1997) found that economic knowl-
edge was directly related to one’s opinion on various
economic issues; moreover, the more economic
knowledge one had, the more likely it was for the
individual to hold an opinion that coincided with
the opinion of most economists.
In terms of influencing public opinion, an
important issue is how to communicate with those
not likely to take an international economics course.
Cass (2000) notes that economists’ arguments for
free trade are often at odds with public discussions.
As discussed previously, economists focus on con-
sumption; however, public discussions tend to focus
on production. The economist stresses that free
trade allows for increases in well-being because
consumers can buy more and varied goods at lower
prices. Meanwhile, public discussions frequently
argue that exports are good, but imports are bad;
exports support jobs, frequently well paying ones,
but imports destroy domestic job opportunities.
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rather than evil is ignored by many. Imports provide
consumers with increased choices of items that
might be of higher quality, lower price, or more
suited to one’s tastes than would otherwise be avail-
able. Exports help us buy imports, but our enjoyment
comes from consuming goods rather than from
producing goods. To point out the folly of viewing
exports as good and imports as bad, nineteenth-
century economist Frédéric Bastiat satirically won-
dered whether the best outcome would be for ships
transporting goods between countries to sink.36 As a
result, countries could have exports without imports.
As noted here previously, the nature of the popu-
lar discussion tends to strengthen the arguments
against free trade in relation to the arguments for
free trade. Cass (2000) notes three types of asymme-
try. The opposition to free trade is strengthened by
its visual appeal. For example, when international
trade is identified as the reason for a plant closure
or a layoff, a picture of a closed plant can be pro-
vided or the consequences for a specific family can
be told.37 Meanwhile, the case for free trade is more
difficult to present in concrete terms.
A closely related asymmetry is that the inten-
sity of the argument likely favors the opponents of
free trade. The opposition to free trade comes from
workers who may lose their jobs. It is easy to see
why such a group would be passionately opposed
to international trade. Conversely, the beneficiaries
of free trade are likely to be more diffuse. Their
individual benefits are more likely to be small and
frequently hard to identify precisely. Thus, passion-
ate support is unlikely on this side of the argument.
Finally, the arguments against free trade are
more readily appreciated than those for free trade.
For example, it is relatively easy to understand that
competition as a result of imports makes it more
difficult for a domestic company to generate profits.
Moreover, the competition puts downward pressure
on wages and causes layoffs. Arguments in favor of
free trade that rely on comparative advantage and
the gains from specialization and exchange are not
likely to be very convincing, especially in light of
the limited knowledge many citizens possess about
how markets function.
Given the preceding obstacles of influencing
the general public, economists must use approaches
and arguments that overcome these obstacles.
Roberts (2000) offers a number of suggestions for
communicating with the “open-minded skeptic.”
Frequently, proponents of free trade suggest
that exports create jobs. On the other hand, oppo-
nents of free trade stress that imports destroy jobs.
It is possible that the focus on jobs distorts one’s
view of free trade. Recall that the previously dis-
cussed survey asked the general public their views
about eliminating tariffs by stating that prices would
decline, but that certain jobs would likely be elimi-
nated. No mention was made of the fact that jobs
would also be created so that the net job effect would
likely be negligible. The bottom line is that trade
policy does affect the distribution of jobs, but is
unlikely to affect substantially the net number of jobs.
Roberts also cautions against stating that free
trade is good for everyone. It is not. Despite the argu-
ment that the removal of a tariff generates benefits to
consumers that exceed the losses of producers, the
producers as well as the workers who are adversely
affected are not always compensated for their losses.
Rather than duck this issue, it should be acknowl-
edged. In addition, policies to assist those incurring
losses, which are discussed later, could be stressed.
Because the costs are easier to see than the
benefits, Roberts suggests the proponents of free
trade attempt to make the gains concrete. Students
in economics classes might be convinced of the
wisdom of free trade policies using the economic
theory and tools that economists find convincing,
but the general public would probably ignore such
a discussion. A compelling case likely requires an
illustration of the gains from trade in the form of
specific examples or reasonable hypothetical exam-
ples. As discussed previously, many individuals do
not see how they gain from free trade or how they
are harmed by trade restrictions. Expressing the
gains of reducing trade barriers in terms of con-
sumer gains (or national gains) per job lost is one
way to argue convincingly. Another specific example
is to show how per capita income in the United
States would increase over a ten-year period if free
trade led to an increased U.S. growth rate of 1 percent
per year. In this case U.S. per capita gross domestic
product in 2000 would have been more than $3,500
higher than its level of $35,400. Most individuals
can appreciate the effect of a roughly 10 percent
pay increase. Moreover, stressing the beneficial
growth effects of free trade moves the focus from a
winners-versus-losers focus to the possibility of
everyone sharing in the benefits of increased growth. 
However, the benefits of economic growth are
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36 This observation is cited in the Economist (2001).
37 This asymmetry is referred to as an “identity bias” by Krueger (1990).
Coughlin REVIEWunlikely to convince some individuals and groups
to support free trade. As international trade has
become more important, its potential economic
and social effects have increased. One consequence
is increased demands that trade discussions encom-
pass a broader range of economic and social issues.
Moreover, Americans do not see the growth of trade
as a key priority. They see international trade as a
goal that should be balanced with other goals, such
as protecting workers, the environment, and human
rights.38
Not surprisingly, expanding the range of issues
complicates trade negotiations. Resolving social
issues is especially difficult because of the tradeoffs
that are required to satisfy competing objectives—
tradeoffs, in fact, for which policymakers lack pre-
cise information. Deardorff and Stern (2000) pose
some of the most challenging tradeoffs. For example,
although child labor may be deplorable, it is possible
that the earnings may be necessary to keep the
children alive. A cleaner environment is desirable,
but maybe not if the cost pushes the poorest coun-
tries further into poverty. Human rights are valuable,
but so is national sovereignty. Obviously, disagree-
ments on the “right” balance are inevitable.
In view of this mixing of social issues with trade
issues, educational efforts in support of free trade
must address the concerns raised by environmental-
ists and others. In fact, strong arguments can be
made that trade liberalization is consistent with
the achievement of social objectives.
Bhagwati (1993) has demonstrated that the argu-
ment that free trade harms the environment can
be handled directly.39 Growth provides additional
revenues for governments to pursue various objec-
tives, including environmental protection.40 How
a specific country decides to spend its additional
revenues depends on the relationship between
increasing incomes and the demand for a better
environment. Generally speaking, the wealthier a
country, the greater is its demand for a better envi-
ronment. However, demand is only part of the story.
One must also consider how growth affects the
production of pollution. Thus, the net effect on the
environment depends on the type of economic
growth. Grossman and Krueger (1993) found, using
cities throughout the world, that sulfur dioxide pol-
lution fell as per capita income rose beyond $5000.
Thus, growth as a result of freer trade should tend
to improve rather than harm the environment.
It is also possible to argue that international
differences in environmental standards are natural
and are not a justification for linking environmental
issues with trade negotiations.41 Different environ-
mental standards for local pollution problems can
be justified because they are necessary for economic
efficiency.
Economic efficiency requires that pollution be
reduced until the point at which the additional bene-
fits of reducing pollution equal the additional costs.
Numerous factors, two of which are highlighted,
affect the level of environmental quality associated
with economic efficiency.42 Assimilative capacity,
which is the capacity of the environment to reduce
pollutants naturally, is one factor. Quite possibly, a
less-industrialized country has greater assimilative
capacity than a more-industrialized country because
of less pollution in the past. Thus, it can tolerate a
higher level of emissions than an industrialized
country without increasing pollution levels.
A second factor likely to affect a country’s level
of environmental quality is its income level. A low-
income country might put a higher value on the
production of goods relative to environmental qual-
ity than a high-income country. This lower value
on environmental quality leads to relatively lower
environmental standards in the low-income country.
To summarize, international differences in
environmental standards are natural and allow
countries to use their productive resources effi-
ciently. Forcing countries to have identical standards
is a recipe for economic inefficiency.43 Economic
efficiency, however, might be of little concern to
environmentalists. If so, then economic education
is unlikely to be effective in convincing environ-
mentalists to alter their opposition to reducing
trade barriers. Some argue that the goal of environ-
mentalists is to use trade policy to impose their
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38 For example, the University of Maryland (2000) survey of public
opinion found 88 percent agreed that increasing international trade
is a goal to be balanced against protecting workers, the environment,
and human rights, even if the result was a slower growth of trade and
the economy in general. 
39 See Butler (1992) for a discussion concluding that free trade and
environmental policies can work together to generate worldwide
economic growth and environmental quality.
40 A similar argument can be made concerning child labor. For example,
the growth resulting from free trade can provide the resources and
opportunities to reduce the participation of child laborers in develop-
ing countries.
41 A similar argument can be made in justifying differences in labor
standards.
42 See Butler (1992) for a more complete discussion of why countries
choose different levels of environmental quality.
43 Note that different regional environmental standards exist within the
United States.
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values are not widely accepted. For example, many
environmentalists want to suspend the trading rights
of countries that sanction the use of purse-seine
nets in tuna fishing and leg-hold traps in trapping.
It is clear that different people hold widely different
views of the relative importance of, say, dolphins
versus the economic livelihood of the Mexican fish-
ing industry. In addition, as Bhagwati (1993) has
noted, the inclusion of idiosyncratic values into
trade negotiations opens the way for numerous
conflicting demands as environmentalists favor
dolphins, Indians have sacred cows, and animal-
rights activists object to slaughterhouses. Such a
scenario would result in dim prospects for reduc-
ing trade barriers.
Reducing the Cost for Those Harmed
As highlighted previously, changes in trade
policy cause gains for some individuals and losses
for others. Generally speaking, high-skilled workers
in the United States tend to benefit relative to low-
skilled workers when trade barriers are reduced.
Those suffering job losses as a result can incur
income losses, reductions in health and pension
benefits, costs associated with relocating, and the
psychological costs of losing a job. The trade adjust-
ment assistance program, which is administered
by the U.S. Department of Labor, allows workers
who lose their jobs because of increased imports
to receive unemployment compensation for an
additional period beyond that received by other
displaced workers.45 In addition, trade adjustment
assistance recipients can also participate in retrain-
ing programs plus receive out-of-area job search
allowances and moving expenses.
Among the arguments to justify the trade
adjustment assistance program is that the program
reduces workers’ lobbying efforts against trade lib-
eralization. Even if voters are motivated by their
perceptions of collective well-being and not simply
their own individual well-being, trade adjustment
assistance might increase support for free trade by
both those who gain and those who lose. In effect,
as Magee (2001) found, trade adjustment assis-
tance payments compensate workers for lost tariff
protection.
Despite disagreeing on numerous items, the
Democratic and Republican members on the U.S.
Trade Deficit Review Commission (2000) agreed
that more resources should be allocated to trade
adjustment assistance programs. Such a position is
consistent with the general public’s opinion that
the U.S. government should do more to help workers
adapt to changes caused by international trade.46 A
more effective trade adjustment program is likely
to generate an increased willingness to support trade
liberalization.47
Another proposal to ameliorate the problems
faced by displaced workers and reduce the opposi-
tion to trade liberalization is to provide wage insur-
ance.48 As noted by the U.S. Trade Deficit Review
Commission, many displaced workers, especially
those with much tenure, suffer not only during the
period between jobs but also after they become
reemployed. For example, the weekly earnings of
all reemployed workers fell 5.7 percent on average
during 1995-97. Those displaced from high-tenure
jobs experienced a wage decline of over 20 percent.
Wage insurance would provide earnings supple-
ments for a set period to workers who become re-
employed at a lower wage.
Proponents of wage insurance, such as Kletzer
and Litan (2001), argue that it provides an incentive
for workers to find a new job quickly as contrasted
with unemployment insurance, which provides an
incentive to delay looking for work. For younger
workers, the quicker reemployment might make it
easier for them to acquire training and new skills
that will make them more employable and produc-
tive over their working lives. For older workers, the
wage insurance might allow them to reach retire-
ment without lowering their standard of living or
altering their retirement plans. On the other hand,
Schoepfle (2000) raises concerns about the poten-
tial costs of wage insurance.49
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44 A similar statement pertains to certain labor groups.
45 See Schoepfle (2000) for an overview of U.S. Department of Labor
programs for dislocated workers and for a history of the trade adjust-
ment assistance program since its passage in 1962.
46 See University of Maryland (2000).
47 Despite its political appeal, the effectiveness of the trade adjustment
assistance program has been questioned. Decker and Corson (1995),
Bohanon and Flowers (1998), and Marcal (2001) study the effective-
ness of this program. See Richardson (2000a) for an identification of
research relevant to redesigning labor-adjustment programs to increase
their effectiveness.
48 Job displacement can result from technological change, downsizing,
restructuring, changes in demand, and changes in public policy (e.g.,
trade liberalization and environmental regulation). 
49 A proposal by Kletzer and Litan (2001) to provide wage insurance and
health insurance subsidies for qualifying displaced workers upon
reemployment was estimated to cost less than $4 billion. Obviously,
the specifics of the program, such as who qualifies and the benefits
provided, will affect the cost.
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During recent years many have argued that
policymakers should expand the agenda for trade
negotiations occurring under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and other bodies. Prior nego-
tiations have produced substantial reductions in
tariff barriers. One result is that the remaining trade
barriers are in the most sensitive industries and
involve the most complex issues. As discussed pre-
viously, sentiment is strong for linking labor and
environmental issues with trade negotiations. What
is unclear is whether such changes would ultimately
increase the prospects for liberalizing trade. Expand-
ing the agenda might provide negotiators with more
opportunities for compromise; however, expanding
the agenda might also bog down negotiations by
introducing issues upon which compromise is very
difficult. In fact, many have come to the conclusion
that expanding the trade agenda would be detri-
mental to liberalizing trade in the United States and
throughout the world.
A discussion by Brown (2000) highlights some
of the challenges of linking labor standards with
trade standards in the WTO.50 The priorities of mem-
ber countries are unlikely to coincide with each
other or with the WTO. For example, the United
States argues for rigorously enforcing high labor
standards. On the other hand, developing countries
desire minimal standards and enforcement because
they fear the standards will provide a cover for pro-
tectionism. Meanwhile, the WTO may resist enforc-
ing labor standards because they are not related to
their original mission of fostering free trade. The
bottom line is that such a linkage is not a promising
approach for generating gains from trade. 
Richardson (2000b) argues that the inclusion
of a targeted set of “market-supportive” new issues
offers a promising way to propel multilateral trade
negotiations. In his view, expanding the negotiations
to cover selected competition, technology, and labor
policies would increase support by small businesses,
technology users, and workers throughout the
world. Moreover, such an expansion would increase
the effectiveness of the market system.51 Thus, both
market enthusiasts and society “win.” In a comment
on Richardson’s paper, Maskus (2000) raises the
fundamental question as to whether the pressures
arising from those concerned about the environ-
ment, labor rights, the impact of technological
change, and globalization can be accommodated
in a way that would allow the WTO to be effective.
Irwin (2000) answers this question negatively
and, furthermore, expresses fears that both friends
and foes of the WTO are pushing for changes in the
organization’s agenda that will prove detrimental
to liberalizing trade. Friends would like to see the
WTO expand its scope to set rules on various new
trade issues—investment policy, competition policy,
and electronic commerce, to name a few. Foes would
like to see the WTO deal with labor and environ-
mental regulations.52 Irwin feels that expanding
the agenda is a recipe for inertia and, even worse,
will create “an international regulatory bureaucracy
in Geneva that will provide full employment for
trade lawyers rather than truly open up markets”
(p. 355). A far better course would be for the WTO
to focus on reducing border measures, especially
those disrupting the free flow of agricultural and
textile products.
Despite the concerns of Irwin and others,
some business leaders in the United States appear
to be softening their opposition to embedding
social agendas in trade agreements.53 Cooper
(2001) reports that in a January 3, 2001, letter to
Charlene Barshefsky, then U.S. Trade Representative,
Caterpillar Inc. Chief Executive Glen Barton argued
that labor and environmental standards were appro-
priate topics as part of future multilateral negotia-
tions. Moreover, currently the Bush administration
is searching for a way to respond to environmental
protection and labor concerns during trade negotia-
tions without allowing these issues to be used for
protectionist purposes.
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50 See Esty (2001) for a discussion of bridging the gap between free
traders and environmentalists.
51 Richardson’s subset of competition policies includes universal com-
mitment to baseline disciplines concerning cartels, mergers, and
anti-competitive behavior. The subset of technology policies includes
distribution-oriented refinements in the WTO’s intellectual property
and trade-related investment agreements. The subset of labor policies
includes worker agency services, specifically freedom for agents to
bargain collectively on behalf of worker associations. 
52 Srinivasan (2000, p. 25) characterizes these opponents of free trade
as the “unholy alliance of protectionists.” This alliance consists of
“industrial labor unions in rich countries, such as the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),
masquerading as champions of the welfare and rights of workers
(particularly child and female workers) in emerging countries, naive
do-gooders who may be genuinely concerned with the welfare of
children, and misguided environmentalists.” 
53 Throughout the second half of the 1990s, U.S. involvement in trade
negotiations has been hamstrung by Republican and Democratic
conflict over linking free trade with labor and environmental stan-
dards. This political divide reflects business opposition and labor/
environmental group support for linking trade negotiations with
social issues.
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CONCLUSION
The economic case for free trade is compelling
for nearly all economists. Free trade policies enable
free market forces to allocate resources to their
most productive activities. This allows a nation to
maximize the value of the goods and services pro-
duced within its borders. Free trade also allows con-
sumers to allocate their incomes to maximize the
value of the goods and services that they purchase
and consume. Numerous models also suggest that
the growth prospects of a nation are improved by
using free trade policies. Moreover, the findings of
empirical studies reinforce economic theory.
Despite these economic benefits, free trade
policies are opposed by a large percentage of the
U.S. public. The opposition consists of various
groups, such as protectionists, labor unions, environ-
mentalists, human rights activists, and economic
nationalists. Clearly, the implementation of trade
policies creates winners and losers. Not surprisingly,
potential losers oppose free trade policies. Moreover,
some oppose free trade because of their recognition
that others will lose. This clash suggests that many
in the general public differ from economists in how
they weigh the costs and benefits of free trade poli-
cies. Others oppose free trade because of concerns
that free trade contributes to the abuse of workers
throughout the world, as well as to environmental
degradation. Thus, these individuals will oppose
reductions in trade barriers until these issues are
addressed.
In view of the potential gains of free trade, an
important question is how to reduce the opposition
to free trade. A first step would be increased educa-
tion concerning the benefits of free trade. Such a
step is not controversial; however, to date, economists
have been only moderately successful in spreading
this good news to a large audience. Illustrating the
gains from free trade using concrete and personal
examples, as opposed to theoretical arguments, is
one suggestion for convincing a larger audience.
A second step involves reducing the cost to the
losers from free trade. A standard view is that the
costs of liberalizing trade fall disproportionately
upon less-skilled workers. Trade adjustment assis-
tance is one policy option that has generated much
political support. A more controversial policy is wage
insurance. Questions about the cost-effectiveness of
both policies, especially the latter, have been raised.
The most controversial step is to attempt to
increase political support for free trade by expanding
the issues covered in trade negotiations. Many
Americans have real demands that the well-being
of workers be safeguarded in developing countries
and that the environment be protected. Whether
these demands can be best served by linking them
to trade agreements is controversial. Arguably, there
are better ways to resolve many of these issues. The
inclusion of labor and environmental issues in trade
negotiations, as well as other issues, may or may
not increase domestic political support. However,
even if the inclusion of these other issues generated
additional domestic support for free trade, it would
not necessarily ensure success in negotiations to
reduce trade barriers: foreign opposition to the
inclusion of these issues, especially in developing
countries, might negate any newly gained domestic
support.
The fact that highly controversial steps are being
suggested as necessary to propel trade negotiations
points to one clear fact. Just as there are no quick
fixes for the social issues that are increasingly linked
to trade issues, there is no quick fix for generating
political support for one of the few things that most
economists agree upon—a nation’s economic well-
being is best served by free trade. 
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